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Abstract
With Europe’s security order becoming ever more fragile, the EU and the OSCE face very
different political and structural challenges. While the EU’s new Strategic Compass emphasizes
its aspirations to become a genuine security actor, the OSCE faces erosion of the participating
States’ consensus on values and weakened executive structures and institutions. Can the OSCE
be regenerated through enhanced cooperation with the EU, and if yes, how? In this article,
we argue that the accelerated rise of the EU as a security actor should not be achieved at the
expense of the OSCE. Rather, cooperation between both organizations should focus on (1)
strengthening the OSCE as an autonomous security organization, (2) using the OSCE as a
genuine forum for dialogue and mutual assurance, and (3) capitalizing on the main strengths of
both organizations while avoiding duplication.
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Introduction
The EU and the OSCE find themselves at
a critical juncture regarding their role in
the European security order. The EU has
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framed its options for dealing with “new
and increasing threats and challenges” in
the form of a Strategic Compass that aims
to “strengthen a common European secu-
rity and defence culture” and to “define
the right objectives and concrete goals for
[its future] policies”.1 According to the
EU Institute for Security Studies, the pur-
pose of the Strategic Compass is “to pro-
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vide political direction for the EU’s secu-
rity and defence and improve the Union’s
operational effectiveness, resilience, capa-
bilities and cooperation with partners”.2
The OSCE faces a different set of chal-
lenges, including deepening internal ten-
sions and a diminishing capacity to ful-
fil its comprehensive security mandate.3
These tensions have led to the erosion
of consensus on the norms that have un-
derpinned the OSCE since the 1970s and
a weakening of its executive structures
and institutions.4 This, in turn, has led
to a decline in the perceived political val-
ue of the Organization and participating
States’ willingness to expend political and
financial capital on it. As Wolfgang Zell-
ner argues, despite the clear need for the
OSCE “as an inclusive platform and an
actor in settings where other IOs [interna-
tional organizations] cannot act”,5 it has
become marginalized in the European se-
curity order.
While the partnership “basket” of the
EU’s Strategic Compass offers a fresh op-
portunity for the EU and the OSCE to
consider the nature of their strategic part-
nership, cooperation between them has
a much longer history. Their shared in-
terests and the benefits of cooperation
have frequently been stressed by repre-
sentatives of both organizations.6 In its
2016 Global Strategy, the EU formally ac-
knowledged the OSCE “as a Europe-wide
organisation [that] lies at the heart of the
European security order” and committed
to “strengthen[ing] its contribution with-
in and its cooperation with the OSCE
as a pillar of European security”.7 It re-
iterated its support for the OSCE in its
2019 review of the Strategy.8 This shared
interest in security and stability has also
manifested itself in prioritizing good gov-
ernance, fighting organized crime, tack-
ling corruption, and acting on the securi-
ty challenges posed by climate change.9
As many scholars have pointed out,
however, in reality the two organizations
have not taken a joint approach to secu-
rity issues, tending to work in parallel
rather than together.10 Despite positive
examples to the contrary, such as the
cooperation between the current OSCE
Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine
and the European Union Advisory Mis-
sion in Ukraine, this trend has become
stronger and more pervasive. Tensions
within the OSCE have grown, and the
EU has begun to strive for greater strate-
gic autonomy as a security actor in Euro-
pe, especially since the 2007 Treaty of Lis-
bon. While a more capable and assertive
EU can (and should) make more mean-
ingful contributions to European securi-
ty, we argue that this should not be at the
expense of the OSCE. To the contrary,
not only is “the OSCE’s survival […] ob-
jectively in the EU’s best interest”,11 but a
strengthened OSCE would best serve the
national interests of the 27 (EU member
states) and the 57 (OSCE participating
States).12
In the following, we propose three
building blocks for an improved partner-
ship. The first is a realistic assessment
of what enhanced cooperation between
the EU and the OSCE can achieve. The
OSCE cannot become an instrument of
EU security interests alone; it must be
strengthened as an autonomous security
actor with capabilities that differ func-
tionally from those of the EU but are
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relevant to the management of security
challenges in areas of common interest.
Second, the EU needs to understand,
use, and strengthen the OSCE as a forum
for dialogue and mutual assurance. This
requires greater openness to engagement
with stakeholders in Russia and countries
“east of the EU” on the meaning and
interpretation of existing OSCE commit-
ments and on contested concepts such
as “sovereignty” and “self-determination”,
thereby ensuring that the hardening divi-
sions in the European security order do
not become permanent.13
Third, a clearer focus on converging
interests among the 27 and the 57 would
translate to a back-to-basics approach
that avoids duplication and capitalizes on
the main strengths of both organizations
across all three dimensions.
We develop this argument in several
steps. In the next section, we provide
a brief overview of the current state of
EU–OSCE cooperation. In section three,
we discuss its complementarities and ob-
stacles in light of the academic debate
on inter-organizational cooperation. In
section four, we conclude with policy rec-
ommendations.
The state of EU–OSCE cooperation
Notwithstanding the EC/EU’s commit-
ment to CSCE/OSCE principles, as evi-
denced in the signing of the Helsinki
Final Act (1975), the Charter of Paris
(1990), and the Charter for European Se-
curity (1999), cooperation was not taken
up in earnest as a topic until the early
2000s, on the basis of the OSCE’s “Plat-
form for Co-operative Security” (1999)14
and the European Council’s conclusions
on “EU–OSCE Cooperation in Conflict
Prevention, Crisis Management and Post-
Conflict Rehabilitation” (2003).15 The lat-
ter highlighted the need to “avoid du-
plication” and to work towards “effect-
ive complementarity”, singling out fact-
finding missions, in-field coordination,
and reciprocal diplomatic support as co-
operation priorities.16
Since 2006, the EU has been accorded
a formal role within the OSCE: “At the
meetings of the decision-making bodies,
the European Commission shall have one
seat next to the participating State hold-
ing the EU Presidency” and “may take
the floor immediately after [that state]”.17
This was further formalized at the inter-
service level in 2018 in an exchange of
letters between the Secretaries General of
the OSCE, the European Commission,
and the European External Action Ser-
vice, in which both organizations com-
mitted to regular consultations and oper-
ational cooperation in areas of common
interest.18 In addition, the High Repre-
sentative of the Union for Foreign Affairs
and Security Policy and Vice-President
of the European Commission usually at-
tends the annual OSCE Ministerial Coun-
cil meeting in December.
The work of the EU at the OSCE is
managed by the Union’s Delegation to
the International Organizations in Vien-
na, where seven staff members are ded-
icated to specific OSCE institutions or
topical dimensions.19 In addition, the
European Council has a Working Party
on the OSCE and the Council of Europe,
which handles the EU’s relations with
Towards a More Strategic Partnership
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these two organizations and coordinates
member states’ common positions on de-
bates in both organizations.20
As for the OSCE, its participating
States have been unable to reach consen-
sus on the establishment of a liaison of-
fice in Brussels. In Vienna, the External
Co-operation Department of the Office of
the Secretary General and a Senior Exter-
nal Co-operation Officer (for all Brussels-
based institutions) are responsible for
OSCE–EU relations. The OSCE’s lack of
more direct liaison structures, especially
in field missions, has made the systemat-
ic coordination of activities with Brussels
difficult.
Until recently, both organizations have
opted for flexibility with respect to the
format of cooperation, with irregular
meetings of the EU and OSCE Troikas,
meetings between the OSCE Secretary
General and the High Representative of
the Union for Foreign Affairs and Securi-
ty Policy, and annual staff-level meetings.
The 2018 exchange of letters identified
areas of common interest that reflect al-
most the entire spectrum of OSCE activ-
ities, including conflict prevention and
mediation, the fight against terrorism,
and promotion of the rule of law and
good governance. This makes agenda-
setting and strategic prioritization diffi-
cult. The difficulty is further compound-
ed by the fluctuation of high-level person-
nel on both sides and structural incom-
patibilities, which make it hard to identi-
fy the right interlocutors and to establish
effective relationships between them.
Complementarities and obstacles
Research on inter-organizational cooper-
ation has found that resource exchange
is the main incentive for cooperation
among organizations. International orga-
nizations cooperate because they are in-
terested in, or depend on, the specific ma-
terial (project funds, infrastructure, per-
sonnel) or immaterial goods (legitimacy,
expertise, reputation) the respective part-
ner can provide.21 Resource exchange is
thus based on complementary interests
between cooperating organizations. Poli-
cy convergence can also be an important
trigger for cooperation and resource ex-
change.
The EU has become a key source of
funding for the OSCE in areas where
EU interests and OSCE needs converge.
The EU is by far the main contributor to
the OSCE’s Special Monitoring Mission
to Ukraine, providing personnel, equip-
ment, and satellite imagery.22 With its
network of delegations in the OSCE area,
it is also able to provide tailor-made sup-
port to OSCE field missions.
The OSCE, for its part, has significant
(albeit currently diminishing) convening
and agenda-setting power, expertise and
tools for conflict prevention, experience
in quiet diplomacy, and a genuinely mul-
tilateral conflict-related mandate. Com-
pared to the EU, which is not perceived
as a neutral actor in the OSCE region’s
protracted conflicts, the OSCE is more
likely to be accepted as a mediator and/or
monitor on the ground. Notwithstanding
the current political divisions between
the OSCE’s participating States, the or-
ganization remains one of the few pan-
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European dialogue fora and is therefore
useful to the EU in the context of institu-
tionalized interaction with Russia on se-
curity issues and beyond. In the field the
OSCE still commands superior expertise
in comparison with the EU, concerning,
for example, conflict mediation. OSCE
field missions can assist the EU, for exam-
ple in identifying the positions and needs
of national minorities. Finally, the OSCE
can be a link, via its Central Asian partici-
pants, for the implementation of the EU’s
Central Asia Strategy.
Cooperation presupposes the existence
of certain conditions beyond the re-
source needs of an organization, how-
ever. Among them are the preferences
of member states, the power asymmetries
between the latter and the organization,
the culture and openness of the organi-
zation, the role of inter-organizational
learning or previous “cooperation paths”,
and the impact of powerful third par-
ties.23 Among the obstacles to a more
active partnership between the EU and
the OSCE is their asymmetry in terms
of power, budget, and structural charac-
teristics. The EU is not an international
organization per se. It commands multi-
billion-euro budgets, and its institutions
have considerable agency. Even in its for-
eign affairs, the Union increasingly de-
viates from inter-governmental decision-
making. On the opposite end of the spec-
trum, the OSCE is a more fragmented
organization, with a cumbersome legal
status, mandatory consensus in decision-
making, and an annual budget of just un-
der €140 million.24 A major consequence
of this asymmetric relationship is the
OSCE’s understandable fear (shared by
significant participating States) of being
pushed into a dependent role by the EU
or of becoming a tool of EU foreign and
security policy.
Further ambivalence arises from mem-
bership, mandates, and aspirations. Al-
though the OSCE includes all twenty-
seven EU member states, it also includes
Russia, all other post-Soviet countries, the
US, Canada, Norway, and the UK.25 With
much more variety in terms of regime
types and foreign policy orientations, the
OSCE lacks the coherence (and hence
the political and economic leverage) of
the EU and understands itself more as
a “forum” than a full-fledged internation-
al organization.26 For effective coopera-
tion, EU member states must therefore
distinguish between their preferences as
EU members and as OSCE participating
States. If the EU does not treat the OSCE
as a security organization in its own
right, closer EU–OSCE cooperation, and
thus a more visible EU presence and in-
fluence in the OSCE, will be unaccept-
able to Russia and other non-EU partici-
pating States.
Concerning mandates and aspirations,
the EU has significantly and increasingly
invested in becoming a security organiza-
tion. By contrast, the OSCE is struggling
to remain relevant in its core fields of
conflict prevention and mediation, pur-
suing issues on which all participating
States can agree but which are marginal
to its mandate and could be more effec-
tively addressed in other arenas. This rais-
es questions about the extent to which
the EU needs the OSCE at all in pursuing
its own interests and whether inevitable
Towards a More Strategic Partnership
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duplications may contribute to the fur-
ther marginalization of the OSCE.
Finally, successful cooperation be-
tween international organizations de-
pends on careful relationship manage-
ment, especially with respect to overlap
in membership. This means developing a
genuine vision of cooperation, convening
on a regular basis, and designing the pro-
cesses of interaction.27 Relationship man-
agement between the EU and the OSCE
remains a work in progress. The current
relationship is under-institutionalized,
and even after the 2018 exchange of let-
ters, top officials admit that further ef-
forts are needed. Indeed, there seems to
be no straightforward design for cooper-
ation, for example linking the different
OSCE entities with the Commission’s
capabilities and funding instruments of
conflict prevention and management.
Moreover, the list of specific cooperation
areas is incoherent and overly long; iden-
tifying priorities and clear benchmarks
would therefore make sense. Another
critical aspect is the oft-applauded ev-
eryday informal cooperation, for which
there is little actual evidence – in con-
trast to the frequent duplication and par-
allel work documented in the research.28
A more promising avenue for relation-
ship management is the role that Helga
Schmid could play as former Secretary
General of the EEAS and current Secre-
tary General of the OSCE, functioning
as a genuine “boundary spanner” and en-
abling the two organizations to cooperate
more effectively.
Policy recommendations: Areas for
enhanced cooperation
Building on our proposed three building
blocks for improved partnership, we re-
commend seven steps that the OSCE and
its participating States and the EU and
its member states could take to enhance
their cooperation. Together, they consti-
tute a new approach that (1) is based on
a realistic assessment of what enhanced
cooperation between the EU and the
OSCE can achieve; (2) is characterized
by a greater degree of openness on the
part of the EU to engagement with stake-
holders in Russia and countries “east of
the EU” within the OSCE context; and
(3) avoids duplication, capitalizing on
the main strengths of both organizations
across all three dimensions.
Strengthening prevention
The  EU  and  the  OSCE  have  different
but partially overlapping strengths regard-
ing  conflict  prevention.  The  EU  has
better  developed  structural  prevention
instruments, while the OSCE has the track
record  and  capacity  to  deal  with  direct
prevention but  often lacks  the financial
resources to act swiftly. Enhanced cooper-
ation could thus take the form of greater
integration  of  prevention  strategies  and
their  operationalisation.  The OSCE could
help  the  EU to  define  better  and more
precise prevention-related benchmarks in
its various strategies, action plans, and pro-
grammes. In turn, the EU should upscale
its financial support (for example through
its  Neighbourhood,  Development  and
a)
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International Cooperation Instrument) to
enable multi-annual OSCE budgets. This
could focus  on intensifying cooperation
in  confidence-building  measures  in  the
context of the OSCE region’s protracted
conflicts and on the High Commissioner
on National Minorities.
Reprioritizing arms control
Once  a  cornerstone  of  OSCE  activity
and  success,  arms  control  norms  and
mechanisms  have  eroded  as  tensions
within  the  Organization  have  increased
and conflicts  have escalated to violence.
The  OSCE  Structured  Dialogue  on
current  and  future  challenges  and  risks
to  security  in  the  OSCE area,  launched
by  OSCE  foreign  ministers  at  the
Ministerial  Council  in  Hamburg  in
December 2016, has the potential to make
a  crucial  contribution  to  restoring  an
effective  arms  control  regime.  An  EU
contribution to strengthening the effectiveness
of  the  Structured  Dialogue  could  include
greater preparedness to discuss it  in EU
fora,  including  in  the  European  Union
Military Committee and the Political and
Security Committee. In turn, EU experts
could  take  part  in  informal  working
groups  and  expert-level  meetings  of
military representatives in the framework
of  the  Structured  Dialogue,  thereby
demonstrating the Union’s political and
diplomatic support.
Facilitating connectivity
The EU and the OSCE each have connec-
tivity agendas. Within the OSCE region
b)
c)
“east of the EU”, the Eurasian Economic
Union represents an alternative to the
EU’s political and economic integration
project. Moreover, China’s Belt and Road
Initiative offers a third vision of connec-
tivity. EU–OSCE cooperation could of-
fer an opportunity to address competition
between the different integration projects
and to begin to work out basic rules that
would facilitate greater compatibility. The
EU could support OSCE efforts to articu-
late a coherent Connectivity 2.0 agenda29
aimed at contributing to a sustainable
and inclusive post-pandemic recovery. As
connectivity is increasingly also a securi-
ty issue, the 27 and the 57 have very
clear common interests when it comes to
the nexuses between climate and security,
technology and security, and governance
and security. EU-supported OSCE initia-
tives that foster confidence building in
the economic and environmental dimen-
sion – for example in the Caspian, Black,
and Mediterranean Seas – could serve
as access points to critical regions, gen-
erate tangible benefits for the local pop-
ulations, and eventually become a path
towards an inclusive and constructive de-
bate on hard security issues.
Countering norm erosion
The OSCE’s comprehensive security con-
cept rests on foundations agreed upon
by the participating States in Helsinki
in 1975 and Paris in 1990 and was reaf-
firmed in the 2010 Astana Commemo-
rative Declaration. As these foundations
have come under increasing attack over
the past decade, EU–OSCE cooperation
d)
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should focus on building alliances of norm-
defending states active in both organizations
and reflecting a balance of opinions across
the 27 and the 57. This could take the
form of a “Group of Friends” that in-
cludes both EU and non-EU participating
States east and west of Vienna and/or fo-
cus on specific OSCE institutions, such




The EU has delegations in all OSCE par-
ticipating States, and the OSCE currently
has operations in thirteen participating
States (all “east of the EU”). Nevertheless,
cooperation is often ad hoc, extends only
to political support, and rarely offers a
sustainable source of financing for under-
resourced and over-stretched OSCE pres-
ences on the ground. Hence, establishing
and consolidating links between EU delega-
tions, EU Special Representatives, and mem-
ber states’ embassies, on the one hand, and
OSCE missions, Special Representatives of
the Chairperson-in-Office, and other field
presences, on the other, should become a
priority area of EU–OSCE cooperation.
This could focus on education-related
and other youth-focused initiatives.
Increasing knowledge exchange and
joint training opportunities
The creation of a joint EU–OSCE pool of
civilian experts and organizing joint training
sessions would facilitate “inter-deployability”
and a mutual understanding of each organi-
e)
f)
zation’s institutional culture. Possibilities
that could be explored include increased
support by the EU or individual member
states for the OSCE Academy in Bishkek
or in-kind contributions from EU mem-
ber states for pre-deployment training of
OSCE staff. The latter could be modelled
on the pre-deployment training courses
for the Special Monitoring Mission to
Ukraine run by the Austrian Armed
Forces International Centre.30
Utilizing Track 2/Track 1.5 initiatives
The above recommendations could be
strengthened by more systematic support
from both organizations for Track 2 or
Track 1.5 initiatives to explore views and
perceptions across a broader range of partici-
pating States on the forms that enhanced
EU–OSCE cooperation might take, the
specific expectations of the 27 and the
57, and the red lines for non-EU partici-
pating States. This would be in keeping
with our key assumption that any discus-
sion of EU–OSCE cooperation must fo-
cus on strengthening the OSCE as the
primary comprehensive and cooperative
security organization in the Euro-Atlantic
and Eurasian area.
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